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CARRIERS.
CARRIERs by land and water, unless relieved by express or im-
plied contract between the bailor and the bailee, are by the common
law responsible for all losses not occasioned by the act of God or
the King's enemies.
Like every other species of bailment the particular responsibility
devolved by law on the bailee may be waived partially or entirely
by the agreement of the parties. Mfodus et conventio vincunt le-
gem.
These few and simple principles rationally applied to this class of
bailments, afford a safe rule by which the liability of common car-
riers by land or by water, by sea or by river, by wagons and
coaches, or by canals or rail-roads, may be determined with entire
certainty.
In the early history of England, the means of internal convey-
ances were pack-horses-then slow and lumbering wagons, which
continued down to a late period in the last century, which saw the
introduction of stage coache and the use of canals, both of which
have within the last five and twenty years been nearly superseded
by the later invention of railways and the application of steam as
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the motive power. Radical changes have also taken place in the
important branches of Life, Fire, 'Marine and Inland Insurance, all
of which, with the increase of transportation caused by the im-
provements of science, have supplied that complete indemnity
against loss which was secured originally only by the imperfect ope-
ration of the common law. The improvements of modern art have in-
finitely increased the speed and the actual amount of transportation,
while they have at the same time decreased the danger of loss, and
have enabled the owner or the insurer to estimate, with nearly posi-
tive certainty, the chances to which the commodities in which they
are interested are exposed.
The common law emanating, as it does, from the decisions of
Judges made year after year, and accommodating itself to the varied
changes of society, to the progress of civilization, to the extension of
commerce, and to the wonderful inventions of art and science, which
have placed the remotest parts of a continent in almost instant com-
munication with each other, is to be found not merely in the Year
Books, (which, to the disgrace of England, must be read ii a bastard
language, which none but a few lawyers 'and antiquarians under-
stand,) but in those daily exhibitions of judicial sagacity which fur-
nished Great Britain last year with 2240 printed cases decided by
its highest tribunals.
We are, therefore, to look not only to the ancient treatises of the
law for the rules which govern commercial intercourse, but we are
to seek them also in the enlightened sense and enlarged views of
the great ;Judges of modern times, who have expounded and applied
with wonderful skill the principles of our legal system, which existed
only in their simplest form in a primitive and rude state of society.
In no branch of the law has this been displayed to more advantage
than in the law of Bailments, beginning with Sir John Iolt, carried
on by Sir William Jones, and terminating with the lamented Story,
whose work on this subject forms a text book in Westminster Hall.
It has always been the law of England, that the responsibility of
the bailee in every kind of bailment could be changed by the agree-
ment of the contracting parties. The liability of the common car-
rier could always be varied by express agreement, and as a corollary,
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by notices brought home to the bailor, and a qualified acceptance in
accordance therewith, which necessarily entered into and formed a
component part of the contract.
This rule is laid down by Judge Story, in his 549th section, as
the settled law of England, and his words have been adopted and
sanctioned by the English Court of Common Pleas, on the eighth of
May last. In delivering the opinion of that Court, in Austin and
anothier v. The Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway
Company,' Mr. Justice Cresswell said: "Notices of various kinds
have from time to time been published by common carriers, with a
view to limit the responsibility cast upon them by common law. At
one period there was a disposition in our Courts to hold that com-
mon carriers could not by their notices shake off that responsibility,
but Mr. Story, in his work on Bailments, 549, observes, ' The right
of making such qualified acceptances seems to have been asserted in
early times. Lord Coke declared it, in a note to Southeote's case. 2
And it was admitted in Morse v. Slue.3 It is now fully recognized
and settled, beyond any reasonable doubt, in England. Tor this
he eites a number of authorities, and we think that he has drawn a
correct conclusion from them."
We must, therefore, assume that those American Judges who
have placed a different construction upon the English authorities,
were mistaken, and that the English Courts never did lay down the
rule that the liability of the common carrier could not be limited or
restrained or waived by the express or implied agfeement of the
parties.
In this state of the law, the Carrier's Act of 11 Geo. 4, and 1
Will. 4, c. 68, was passed on the 23d July, 1830, by which limita-
tions by public notice were prohibited, but by the 6th section,
special contracts or agreements remained as they were before its
passage, thereby distinctly recognizing the power of the common
carrier in all cases, by a special agreement, to limit his responsibili-
ty in such manner as might be mutually agreed upon, and also
121 Law J., (C. P.) Reports, p. 179, 183; 16 Jar. 763 S. C. and post. "Recent
Eng. Cases."
24 Rep. 83. 31 Vent. 238.
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affirming the former doctrine of the Courts, that it could be done by
public notice brought home to the knowledge of the bailor, and thus
creating a qualified acceptance only.
The rule, therefore, of the English common law, was that the
liability of the common carrier might be limited in part or in whole
by express contract or by public notice and impliec contract, and
such unquestionably should be the law of every American State de-
riving its common law from England, except so far as it has been
altered by legislative enactment.
In our sister state of New York, a portion of its Judiciary did
attempt to establish a contrary doctrine as a rule of the common
law, and without legislative aid to engraft it upon their own juris-
prudence. In Hollister v. A.owlen, and Cole v. Goodwin,2 decided
n 1888, limitations by public notice were declared ilegal, and in
the last case Mr. Justice Cowen, in delivering the opinion of the
Court, took the broad ground that the common carrier could,
not, even by express agreement, limit his liability, it being con-
trary to the policy of the common law, which only excepted losses
by the act of God and the King's enemies. This was followed
in 1842, by Gould v. fill,3 which decided that an express written
contract could not limit the responsibility of the carrier, and Mr.
Justice Cowen, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "For
myself I shall do little more than refer to my opinion in Cole v.
Goodwin,4 and the reasons for such opinion as stated in the course
of that case. It was to the effect that I could no more regard a
special acceptance as operating to take from the duty of the com-
mon carrier than a general one. I collect what would be a contract
from both instances, provided it be lawful for the carrier to insist
on it; and such is the construction which has been given to both by
all the Courts; the only difference lies in the different kinds of evi-
dence by which the contract is made out." "When the Jury have
found that the goods were delivered with intent to abide the terms
of the general notice, I understand a contract to be as effectually
fastened upon the Bailor as if he had reduced it to writing."
'19 Wendell, 234. 2 19 Wendell, 281.
3 2 Hill, 628. 419 Wendell, 281.
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It will be observed, therefore. that the law thus declared by the
Supreme Court of New York, was founded upon the assumption
that the policy and rigor of the Common Law prohibited every at-
tempt to limit the liability of common carriers, whether by implied
or express agreement. This is a tangible proposition, and is either
true or false in toto.
The two last cases were decided by a bare majority, (Justices
Cowen and Bronson,) Chief Justice Nelson dissenting, which of
course weakened their authority.
Tie loss of the steamer Lexington, on Long Island Sound, by
fire, on the 10th January, 1840, has tested the soundness of the
principle thus clearly stated by Judge Cowen. In .I ale vs.. The
-ew Jersey ,Steam .Navigation Company,' the Supreme Court
of Connecticut, 1843, decided, that the contract being made in
New York to carry carriages from thence to Boston, the law of
New York was the law of the contract, and in ascertaining what
that rule was, they followed the decisions so far as regarded public
notices, but did not find it necessary to consider what would be the
case if there had been a bill of lading containing an express excep-
tion of fire, nor what would be the law of Connecticut in such
cases. In 1848, the same question in relation to a bill of lading
came before the Supreme Court of the United States, in The .New
Jersey Steam Navigation Company vs. The Merehant's Banc,2
and Judge Nelson decided that if Could vs. Mfll, was the law
of New York, it was not the law of the commercial world, and
therefore they were not bound to recognize it. This case establish-
ed the doctrine in conformity with the settled English rule, as
stated by Lord Tenterden,- that the exception of fire in a bill of
ladirg was a valid one, and Gould vs. .till, was thus denied to be
law, by the highest tribunal in the United States.
On 28 September, 1850, The Supreme Court of the City of New
York, in Dorr vs. The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company,'
following the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States,
115 Conn. 539. 26 Uoward, 344.
3 Abbott on shipping, 321, 380. ' 4 Sanford, S. C. Reports, 136.
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treats Gould vs. Hill as overruled, and no longer the law of New
York.
The rule therefore laid down in 1838, and lauded by Mr. Angell,
in his able work on carriers, has had but a short lived existcnce,
and the ground upon which it was put by Judge Cowen, in Gould
vs. Hill, shows that in overruling that case Hollieter vs. Noowlen,
and Cole vs. Goodwin, Black vs. Faxton,' and The Camden and
Amboy JailRoad and Transportation " Company vs. Belknap,2
fall with it, and that the only sound rule is that of the Old English
Common Law, as expounded by Judge Story, and confirmed by the
express approbation of the English Courts.
The New York decisions on the subject of common carriers, have
given rise to some singular changes of opinion in cases hardly dis-
tinguishable from them. In Alexander vs. Greene,' the Supreme
Court of New York, in 1842, decided that the proprietors of a
steam tow boat were not common carriers, and therefore could, like
all other bailees, exempt themselves by express agreement from
all liability. This was reversed in December, 1844, in the old
Court of Errors,' nearly unanimously, for various reasons, but
not deciding that they were common carriers. In 1849, in Wells
vs. The Steam Navigation Company,5 the present Court of
Appeals decided that they were not common carriers, and Judge
Bronson, in delivering the opinion of that tribunal, remarks very
sarcastically upon the impossibility of ascertaining on what ground
the former Court of Errors reversed his decision in 3 Hill. The
whole of this difficulty would have been avoided if the Supreme
Court of New York had followed the doctrine of the Common Law,
and had declared that common carriers, like all other bailces, could
limit their responsibity by express or implied contract.
We have perused with great pleasure the late English cases re-
ported in the present year, which carry to its utmost extent the
doctrine which we believe to be that of the common law. They
are the decisions of the three great Courts of Common Law-The
Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer, composed
'21 Wendell, 153. 2 Wendell, 354. 33 Hill, 9.
47 Hill, 533. 52 Comstock, 204.
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of fifteen very able Judges, and some of them equal to any that
have ever sat in Westminister Hall, forming a body of authority
spread over a few months, which can rarely be met with on any
single branch of the law.
In Chippendale vs. The Lancashire and Railway Company,'
on the 26th November, 1851, the Court of King's Bench, follow-
ing their own decisions in Shaw vs. The York and Midland Rail-
way Company,2 and Austin vs. The Manchester, Sheffield, and
Lincolnshire Railway ompany,3 decided that a ticket given by
the Company and signed by the Bailor or his Agent, .containing
the following-" N. B. This ticket is issued subject to the owner
undertaking all risks of conveyance whatever, as the Company will
not be responsible for any injury or. damage howsoever caused,
occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon the Lan-
cashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, or in their vehicles,"
formed a special contract between the parties, and exempted the
Company from all risk whatever of damage to the animals during
the journey.
A similar decision was made as we have already stated, by the
Court of Common Pleas, on the 8th May, 1852,' and in Carr
vs. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company' decided
on the same day, the Court of Exchequer laid down the same rule
in its broadest extent. Baron Parke (a very great authority) said
" such a contract was made in this case, and the only question is as
to the meaning of the contract; according to the old cases there
was this limitation upon the construction of carrier's notices-that
unless a carrier excluded is liability in express terms-according
to the ordinary terms of :the notice, he would be responsible for
gross negligence. The practice of a carrier protecting himself by'
notice, was put an end to by the carrier's act." Baron Martin
said "This is the case of a special contract which the Plaintiff has
adopted and assented to. Without doubt, at common law a carrier
is entitled to make a special contract." "Insurers are answerable
for gross negligence, and if goods may be insured, others may con-
121 Law J.R. (Q. B.) 21. 220 Law J. R. (Q. B.) 440. a 18ibid. 181; 13(Q. B.) 347.
421 Law J. R. (C. P.) 179. 521 Law J. Rep. Exchequer, 20i1.
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tract that they will not be answerable for their own gross negligence."
"I am to look only at the terms of the notice, and if the carrier
had been desirous of preparing a contract by which he would get
rid of his liability, in respect of gross negligence, lie could not have
used more apt words than those that are contained in this notice.
"With respect to the argument of inconvenience, the answer is,
that we have nothing to do except to carry out this contract, the
parties concerned and not ourselves are to judge of the incon-
venience. If we hold the carriers in this case responsible for gross
negligence, we shall. place them in the situation of insurers and
underwriters."
On the 10th May, 1852, in The Great -Aorthern Railway Com-
pany v. J"orville,' the Queen's Bench, in considering a ticket issued
by the appellants similar to the one before quoted, and how far it
formed a special contract under the circumstances of that particular
case, give their construction of the Carrier's Act of 1830. Justice
Coleridge said: "The case shews sufficient to induce us to treat the
Railway Company as common carriers of horses.- That brings them
within the Act of Parliament. It is conceded for the respondent,
that the horse was carried under a contract, but it is said that was
a mere contract to be inferred from the notice in the ticket; and it
is concluded that as the notice spoken .of in section 4 of the Car-
rier's Act was only available if knowledge of it was brought home
to the party sending the goods from which knowledge-assent was
to be inferred-arid from that assent a contract-that the Legisla-
ture clearly intended to distinguish between that sort of contract
created by the notice and the contract mentioned in section 6, but
no stress has been laid upon the word "public" in the 4th section.
Now, I think that that word receives a meaning from the preamble,
for is there said that carriers had difficulty in fixing the party
with knowledge of notices published by them. It seems to-me that
section 4 refers t5 such public notices, whereas section 6 relates to
contracts made by the parties when they come together. This case,
I think, falls clearly within section 6. The plaintiff comes with
121 Law Y. Rep. (Q. B.) 319.
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his horse to the station, pays for the carriage of it, and the clerk
produces the ticket; u'hether the plaintiff signs it or not is im-
material; if he agrees to the terms set forth in, it, he is bound by
them."
Mr. Justice Erie said: "Whether the plaintiff had signed the
paper, or whether the clerk had mentioned the terms, or whether
the latter had delivered to the plaintiff a ticket saying what the
terms were, there would have been in each case good evidence of
an agreement between the parties."
In De Rothschild v. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company,'
the Court of Exchequer, on the 2d of June, 1852, decided that loss
by thieves was not within the exception in the bill of lading given
by the Company, which was in these words: " The act of God, the
Queen's enemies, pirates, robbers, fire, accidents from machinery,
boilers and steam, the dangers of the seas, roads and rivers of what-
ever nature or kind- soever, excepted."
It was not a loss by "robbers," or by "dangers of the roads."
In Towles v. The Great Western Railway Oompany,2 the same
Court decided that a Railway Company carrying goods beyond
their own line may limit their liability to their own railway.
The reasoning of these cases is unanswerable, and establish con-
clusively, as a settled principle of the common law, that common
carriers can, like all other bailees, limit their liability by express
agreement, and also by implied contract, and that where the know-
ledge of such limitation is brought home to the bailor, either by
public or private notice, the acceptance of the goods to be carried
is a qualified acceptance and not a general one, and that it lies on
the bailor to show that he r pudiated the terms of the notice or the
contract of which it was a part. If the bailor does not choose to
subject his goods to such an acceptance, he must not send them, but
pursue his remedy in another form.
All goods sent to New York, either from Great Britain or the
other States of the Union, are subject to the rules of the common
law, as understood in England and elsewhere, whilst goods sent from
'21 Law J. Rep. (Exch.) 273. 2Lovell's Digest, 1852, p. 523.
